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1 Introduction
The paper aims at uncovering a tension between two fundamental kinds of incentive properties
of voting mechanisms: strategy-proofness, i.e. the incentive to reveal preferences truthfully,
and participation, i.e. the incentive to invest the cost of casting one’s vote. Strategy-proofness
is desirable because without it the social outcome cannot be assessed vis-a`-vis the true pref-
erences of voters.1 But for the same reason, participation is crucial because one cannot assess
the merit of an alternative as a social outcome if only few of the agents in fact provide
information about their respective preferences even if these signals are truthful.
The pivotal voter model (Downs, 1957; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983) posits that rational
agents will engage in a voting procedure if and only if the expected benefit of doing so exceeds
its costs. Since the expected benefit can be positive only if an agent is indeed able to influence
the outcome, the possibility of being pivotal is essential for a positive participation decision
whenever participation comes even at a small but positive cost. Strategy-proofness, on the
other hand, limits the extent to which an agent can influence the outcome: if at all, a voter
can change the outcome only to a less preferred outcome. One may thus wonder to what
extent strategy-proofness is compatible with participation when voting is costly.
We study this question in a simple voting model with complete information. Our main
departure from most of the literature on the pivotal voter model is that we assume a rich
one-dimensional space of alternatives in which individuals generically have different top al-
ternatives. As we shall see, this radically changes the properties of equilibria. Of course, our
assumption requires that there are more alternatives than voters, therefore our model applies
to decisions in small committees and not to ‘large’ elections in which there are many more
voters than alternatives.
Agents take two decisions: whether or not to participate in the voting procedure, and if
so, which vote to cast. We consider two versions of this general set-up: a sequential model
and a simultaneous model. The sequential model has two stages: in the first stage agents
simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in a committee, and in the second stage a
simultaneous vote is cast by the committee members on the level of a one-dimensional variable.
In the simultaneous model, the participation and voting decisions are made simultaneously
by all agents. In either model, we assume that agents incur positive cost if and only if they
in fact cast a vote. We shall see that while the two models may lead to different predictions
in general, for our main result the timing of decisions is in fact not relevant.
In order to ensure the existence of strategy-proof voting mechanisms, we will assume that
voters’ preferences are single-peaked. In this case, the class of all anonymous and strategy-
proof mechanisms has been characterized by Moulin (1980) as the generalized median mech-
anisms, or the median rule with ‘phantom voters.’
As a simple example, think of a faculty meeting on a Friday afternoon at which the
yearly expenditure shares, say, for research and teaching have to be determined (given a fixed
budget). Each faculty member deliberates about whether or not to participate in the voting
procedure. In the sequential model, one can think of the participation decision as being taken
before the actual meeting. In the simultaneous model, there could be an announcement during
1For a closely related recent argument for strategy-proofness, see Dasgupta and Maskin (2019).
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the meeting that a vote would be taken after extensive discussion, and committee members
may decide to leave early thereby abstaining from the collective decision. The assumption
of complete information is strong but does not seem to be unrealistic in such a scenario; in
fact, since all strategy-proof mechanisms only depend on the top alternative of each voter, it
is sufficient to know each colleagues’ top choice.
Our main result shows that in either version of the model there exists a generically unique
equilibrium in which (at most) one single individual participates provided that the voting
mechanism satisfies, in addition to strategy-proofness and anonymity, a condition of ‘respon-
siveness’ in the sense that the collective outcome reacts to a uniform strict increase (or strict
decrease) of all votes. The identity of the single participant depends on the voting mechanism,
but it is always either the agent with the lowest, or the agent with the highest top alternative.
The conclusion is in stark contrast to other voting mechanisms that are not strategy-proof.
For instance, if the collective outcome is determined to be the average of the individual votes
(Renault and Trannoy, 2005), every voter can shift the outcome by a positive amount and full
participation is indeed an equilibrium if participation costs are sufficiently small. But while
anonymous and responsive, taking the average does evidently not define a strategy-proof
mechanism.
The intuition behind the single participation equilibrium under strategy-proofness is easily
explained by looking at the case of two voters. Strategy-proofness and the responsiveness
condition jointly imply that in the case of two voters the outcome must coincide with one of
the two voters’ top alternative; anonymity implies that it cannot depend on the identity of
the voter, hence it must be either the lower or the higher top alternative. In the first case,
if the agent with the lowest top alternative participates, no other agent has an incentive to
participate (since costs are positive); in the latter case, the same holds if the agent with the
highest top alternative participates. The proof that there no other equilibria is more involved
(see below).
Relation to the Literature
The question of participation when voting is costly has been extensively discussed in the
literature ever since the first formal formulation of the pivotal voter model by Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983), see among many others, Bo¨rgers (2004) for a seminal theoretical contribu-
tion and Levin and Palfrey (2007) for empirical results based on experimental data. The vast
majority of the contributions in the literature studies the case of majority voting among two
alternatives. Under complete information, a key issue is to analyze the equilibrium conse-
quences of the fact that a large fraction of voters shares the same preferences. The resulting
coordination problem is typically addressed by an analysis of mixed equilibria, see No¨ldeke
and Pen˜a (2016); Mavridis and Serena (2018) for recent contributions. In the present paper,
we set this problem aside by assuming that voters have distinct preferences (and preference
tops) which is the generic case in our framework with a rich set of alternatives.
The paper closest to ours is Osborne et al. (2000). These authors also study a complete
information environment with individuals that have single-peaked preferences. In their model,
the authors assume that agents vote truthfully and show that ‘extreme’ voters are more
likely to participate than ‘moderate’ voters. Our analysis complements theirs by providing
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a game-theoretic foundation for the assumption of sincere voting. Indeed, in our model this
is justified by the strategy-proofness of the underlying voting mechanism. An important
consequence is that in the case of an even number of participants, strategy-proofness and the
responsiveness condition force asymmetric treatment of the two middle (‘median’) votes. Our
main result does not strictly contradict the intuition of Osborne et al. (2000), but qualifies
it in an important way. Under the responsiveness condition, the single participant is indeed
always an ‘extreme’ voter: either the agent with the lowest or the agent with the highest top
alternative; but as explained above, the rationale is not that the moderate voters cancel each
other out. Moreover, without the responsiveness property, equilibria can occur in which only
‘moderate’ agents participate, see Section 4 below.
2 The model
We denote the set of agents by N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Each agent i is characterized by a single-
peaked (ordinal) preference relation <i over a compact interval in the reals which we assume
to be normalized to unity, i.e. [0, 1] ⊆ R. One possible interpretation is that each 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
represents the expenditure share for a public project; but there are other, purely ordinal
interpretations as well (e.g. potential positions on a political spectrum). In fact, none of our
results depends on the assumption of a continuous space of alternatives; what is important is
that there are sufficiently many more alternatives than agents.
Single-peakedness means that each agent i has a unique top alternative 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 (the
‘peak’) such that, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], we have x i y whenever y < x ≤ pi or pi ≤ x < y.2
Agents decide whether or not to participate in a committee that decides on the level of
the one-dimensional variable x ∈ [0, 1] by a voting procedure. Each agent i faces a positive
participation cost ci > 0. This cost may vary from agent to agent, it may depend on the
finally chosen outcome, and even on the set of the other participating agents; in fact, all what
matters for our purpose is that these costs are strictly positive for all agents. In particular,
we could allow the cost to be private information. For each possible non-empty set K ⊆ N of
participants, there is a social choice function FK(<1, ....,<#K) ∈ [0, 1] that maps every profile
of preferences of the agents in K to an outcome in [0, 1]. The collection F = {FK}∅6=K⊆N
of these social choice functions is referred to as a voting mechanism. The employed voting
mechanism is common knowledge among the agents.
In our model with endogenous participation, we need to specify agents’ preferences <̂i
over pairs (x,K) of outcomes and sets of participants K who actually cast a vote. We denote
by x0 the (exogenously determined) outcome if nobody participates in the voting process, and
will make the following assumptions. For all i ∈ N ,
(i) the outcome x0 is strictly worse than the most preferred outcome with single own par-
ticipation, i.e.
(pi, {i}) ̂i (x0, ∅),
2Note that we do not need to make any assumptions about the comparisons of alternatives on different sides
of the peak; in fact, the preference relation may even be incomplete and refrain from making such comparisons.
4
(ii) for every fixed set K 6= ∅ the preference over outcomes is given by <i, i.e.
(x,K) <̂i (y,K) ⇐⇒ x <i y,
(iii) for every fixed x ∈ [0, 1], non-participation is strictly preferred to participation (and
indifference with respect to the composition of the set of participants otherwise), i.e. for
all K,K ′ 6= ∅,
{i 6∈ K or i ∈ K ′} =⇒ (x,K) <̂i (x,K ′),
{i 6∈ K and i ∈ K ′} =⇒ (x,K) ̂i (x,K ′).
Observe that no assumptions are made about agents’ preferences comparing an outcome
without participation to a strictly better outcome with own participation; indeed, such trade-
offs would determine the particular magnitude of participation cost.
We will consider two variants of the model, a simultaneous and a sequential version. In the
sequential version, agents first simultaneously decide whether or not to participate and vote
simultaneously in a second stage after having observed who the other participants are. By
contrast, in the simultaneous version, both the voting and participation decisions are made
simultaneously. While the equilibria in general differ in the two models (see the discussion
section below), the main conclusions of the present paper are robust with respect to the timing
of decision.
In our main result, we will require the voting mechanism to be anonymous and strategy-
proof. The anonymity condition has two components: first, for each given set of participants
K, the outcome under FK is invariant with respect to permutations of the agents in K;
secondly, the employed social choice function FK should depend only on the number of agents
in K. Using the latter condition, we can write F k for all social choice functions FK with
#K = k, and describe the voting mechanism F = {F k}1≤k≤n in terms of n social choice
functions, one for each number of participants.
Strategy-proofness requires that truth-telling be a (weakly) dominant strategy for all par-
ticipating agents: for all K, i ∈ K, <i, <′i, <K−i,
F k(<i,<K−i) <i F k(<′i,<K−i),
where k = #K and <K−i denotes any profile of preferences for the agents in K other than i.
By a famous result of Moulin (1980), the conditions of anonymity and strategy-proofness
jointly imply that all social choice functions F k are ‘generalized medians’ with k+ 1 so-called
‘phantom voters.’ Specifically, for each k ∈ {2, ..., n}, F k only depends on the individual
peaks, i.e. for some function fk : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]
F k(<1, ....,<k) = fk(p1, ..., pk),
and there exist fixed values αk1 , α
k
2 , ..., α
k
k+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
fk(p1, ..., pk) = med{p1, ..., pk, αk1 , αk2 , ..., αkk+1}, (2.1)
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where med denotes the usual median operator and the pi are the peaks of <i for each partici-
pating agent i; note that there are 2k+1, i.e. an odd number of values in (2.1). An important
example is the standard median rule with an odd number of participants; in this case, half of
the phantom voters are placed at 0 and half are placed at 1.
We will say that F k, respectively fk, satisfies responsiveness if, for all p1, ..., pk, p
′
1, ..., p
′
k,
p′i > pi for all i ∈ K ⇒ fk(p′1, ..., p′k) 6= fk(p1, ..., pk).
Responsiveness can be viewed as a condition of ‘local non-imposition:’ if every agent desires
a strictly higher (lower) outcome, the chosen alternative should move at least minimally.3
While arguably a weak and plausible condition, responsiveness does restrict the set of
admissible voting mechanisms, as follows.
Observation. The generalized median functions fk in (2.1) satisfy responsiveness if and
only if all ‘phantom voters’ are either at 0 or at 1, i.e. for all j = 1, ..., k+ 1, αkj ∈ {0, 1}, and
neither are all phantom voters located at 0 nor at 1. In particular, in this case the generalized
median always coincides with one of the peaks of the agents and the corresponding voting
mechanism is efficient.
Proof. To verify this, suppose that, for some k and j0 ≤ k + 1, one has 0 < αkj0 < 1. Clearly,
for any given set of the other phantom voters αkj , j 6= j0, one can choose peaks pi ∈ (0, 1)
all distinct from αkj0 such that med{p1, ..., pk, αk1 , ..., αkk+1} = αkj0 . But then the generalized
median does not react to a sufficiently small uniform move of all peaks. The same is evidently
true if all k+1 phantom voters are located either at 0 or at 1. Conversely, if all k+1 phantom
voters are either at 0 or at 1, but not all of them at the same location, the generalized median
must be one of the k peaks of the real agents; hence the underlying mechanism is efficient
and must react to a uniform move of all peaks.
It is well-known (Moulin, 1980) that under efficiency, the generalized median functions fk
in (2.1) can be assumed to have k − 1 instead of k + 1 phantom voters. Generalized medians
for which all k− 1 phantom voters are at one of the two extremes are also known as the order
statistics. Specifically, the choice of the i-th lowest value of the {p1, ..., pk} is referred to as
the i-th order statistic, and corresponds to the generalized median in which k − i phantom
voters are at 0 and i − 1 phantom voters are at 1, see Caragiannis et al. (2016) for further
discussion.
In the present work, we are not focusing on the coordination problem that arises if several
agents have the same top alternative. We therefore assume in all what follows that agents’
peaks are in generic position, i.e. that no two peaks coincide: pi 6= pj for all pairs i, j ∈ N
of distinct agents. If all social choice functions F k are strategy-proof, voting truthfully is the
unique (weakly) dominant strategy for every participant in the simultaneous game, and in
every second-stage voting subgame of the sequential game. We will therefore assume that
all participants who actually cast a vote submit their true peak. This assumption could be
3Intuitively, it should clearly move in the same direction; in the present context, this slightly stronger
requirement is redundant because it follows from responsiveness plus strategy-proofness.
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further justified by an appeal to an equilibrium refinement concept such as perfectness (Selten,
1975), or strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959)4.
3 Main result
Theorem 1. Suppose that the voting mechanism is anonymous, strategy-proof and responsive,
and that all individuals’ voting costs are positive.
a) The simultaneous voting game has a unique perfect equilibrium in which exactly one
agent participates.
b) The sequential voting game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all agents
choose their unique (weakly) dominant strategy in the second stage; in this equilibrium,
again exactly one agent participates.
In either model, the participating agent is either the individual with the highest peak, or the
individual with the lowest peak.
Proof. The assumptions on the voting mechanism imply that, for all non-empty sets K ⊆ N of
participating agents, the outcome is determined by a generalized median with #K−1 phantom
voters. Moreover, by anonymity, the set of phantom voters only depends on k = #K.
We first show that this implies the existence of an equilibrium with a single participant.
As before, denote by p1, ..., pn the preference peaks of the agents, and assume without loss
of generality that p1 < p2 < ... < pn. For #K = 2, there is one phantom voter α
2
1, and
by the Observation in the previous section, we have either α21 = 0, or α
2
1 = 1. Suppose
the former, then the single participation of agent 1 (who reports truthfully) constitutes an
equilibrium. Indeed, the outcome then is p1 which by assumption is preferred by agent 1 to
x0 (the outcome if nobody participates). Every other agent has a higher peak and can thus
not unilaterally change the outcome because α21 = 0; hence, if costs are positive each other
agent prefers not to participate. The argument is completely symmetric if α21 = 1, in which
case single participation of individual n is an equilibrium. Note that the argument applies to
the dynamic model in the same way as to the simultaneous game.5
It remains to show that there are no other equilibria. By contradiction, suppose we have
an equilibrium with the set K ⊆ N of participants where #K > 1. If this situation constitutes
an equilibrium, it is optimal for all i ∈ K to participate; we will show that this is not possible.
By re-numbering agents, we may assume that K = {1, ...., k} and p1 < p2 < ... < pk. By
the Observation above, there exists j ∈ K with fk(p1, ..., pk) = pj . First assume that j = 1,
i.e. that the voter with the lowest peak gets her most preferred alternative. Then, voter k
4In the implementation literature, there has been some discussion on the fact that that the median rule (as
well as generalized medians) may have other Nash equilibria, in which agents do not follow their unique weakly
dominant strategy (see Yamamura and Kawasaki (2013)). For instance, if k ≥ 3 and all agents cast exactly
the same (non-truthful) vote nobody is pivotal, and hence such vote profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
However, such equilibria are evidently neither robust against trembles, nor against deviations by coalitions of
agents.
5Of course, the complete strategy in the dynamic game also specifies, for each non-participant, truth-telling
in all counterfactual participation situations.
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(the one with the highest peak among the participants) has an incentive to abstain; indeed,
by the efficiency of fk−1 the outcome without voter k cannot be smaller than p1. By a similar
argument, one can show that j 6= k.
Thus, we must have that 1 < j < k for the individual j who receives her peak pj . In this
case, the assumed optimality of participation by agent 1 implies that
fk−1(p2, ..., pk) = med{p2, ..., pk, αk−11 , ..., αk−1k−2} > pj , (3.2)
since otherwise agent 1 would prefer not to participate thereby saving the associated cost.
Similarly, the assumed participation of agent k implies that
fk−1(p1, ..., pk−1) = med{p1, ..., pk−1, αk−11 , ..., αk−1k−2} < pj . (3.3)
Without agent 1 there are j−1 peaks that are below or equal to pj . By (3.2), the generalized
median fk−1(p2, ..., pk) with k− 1 participants (i.e. agents 1 to k− 1) is strictly above pj ; this
implies that at most (k − 1− j) of the k − 2 phantom voters {αk−11 , ..., αk−1k−2} can be located
at 0. Similarly, without agent k there are k − j peaks above or equal to pj . By (3.3), the
generalized median fk−1(p1, ..., pk−1) with k − 1 participants (i.e. agents 2 to k) is strictly
below pj ; this implies that at most j − 2 of the k− 2 phantom voters {αk−11 , ..., αk−1k−2} can be
located at 1. By the responsiveness, all of the k− 2 phantom voters have to be located either
at 0 or at 1. But we have just shown that under conditions (3.2) and (3.2) this is not possible
since
(k − 1− j) + (j − 2) = k − 3 < k − 2.
Thus, there can be no equilibrium in which more that one agent participates. This concludes
the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Discussion
In order to assess the scope and the robustness of Theorem 1, we now consider each of its
assumptions. We explain why they are necessary for the conclusion and we discuss what
happens if they were dropped.
Anonymity
Our anonymity condition has two components. First, it requires the voting mechanism not
to depend on the ‘names’ of voters for any given set of participants; secondly, it requires that
the same voting mechanism is employed for all subsets with the same number of participants.
Arguably, both conditions are natural in the present context. The first part is a standard
assumption in voting theory, and in fact Moulin’s characterization of all strategy-proof mech-
anisms for single-peaked preferences in terms of phantom voters needs this assumption. In
our present variable electorate context the second part also appears to be highly plausible.
Importantly, it also guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies (and its
uniqueness). We show this by means of two simple examples, as follows.
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Assume that all conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied except the second part of the
anonymity condition, and consider the following examples with N = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose that if
the set of participants consists of agents 1 and 2, the outcome function f{1,2} chooses the higher
peak, i.e. we have α
{1,2}
1 = 1 for the corresponding phantom voter; if the set of participants
consists of agents 1 and 3, the outcome function f{1,3} chooses the lower peak, i.e. α{1,3}1 = 0
for the corresponding phantom voter; and finally, if the set of participants consists of agents
2 and 3, the outcome function f{2,3} chooses again the higher peak, i.e. α{2,3}1 = 1 for the
corresponding phantom voter. Evidently, this specification violates the (second part of the)
anonymity condition. Suppose that agents are ordered so that p1 < p2 < p3. For no agent
single participation is an equilibrium: if agent 1 is the single voter, agent 2 has an incentive to
join; if agent 2 is the single voter, agent 3 has an incentive to join; and if 3 is the single voter,
agent 1 has an incentive to join. A situation with two participants cannot be an equilibrium
either because, by the responsiveness condition, one of the two gets her peak in which case
the other has an incentive to abstain and save the voting costs. Finally, full participation
cannot be an equilibrium either. Indeed, suppose that all agents participate; again by the
responsiveness condition, one of the agents must receive her peak. If agent 1 receives her
peak, agent 2 has an incentive to abstain, because this would not change the outcome and
agent 2 would save the participation cost; similarly, if agent 2 receives her peak, agent 3 has
an incentive to abstain, and if agent 3 receives her peak, agent 1 has an incentive to abstain.
Hence, in this example there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Here is an example in which there are several equilibria, including one with full participa-
tion. If all agents participate, the social choice function f{1,2,3} chooses the standard median,
in other words, the corresponding phantom voters are given by α
{1,2,3}
1 = 0 and α
{1,2,3}
2 = 1;
if agents 1 and 2 participate, the social choice function f{1,2} chooses the lower peak, i.e. the
corresponding phantom voter is given by α
{1,2}
1 = 0; if agents 2 and 3 participate, the social
choice function f{2,3} chooses the higher peak, i.e. the corresponding phantom voter is given
by α
{2,3}
1 = 1. No matter how we specify the outcome in the case that the set of participants
consists of agents 1 and 3, this already implies that for sufficiently small participation costs
full participation is an equilibrium. Indeed, if all agents participate the agent with the me-
dian peak gets her peak and hence has no incentive to abstain if her participation costs are
sufficiently small; for either of the other two agents, unilateral non-participation would move
the outcome further away from their respective peak, so neither of them has an incentive to
abstain as well. There also exists an additional single participation equilibrium. Indeed, for
the set of participants {1, 3} we either have α{1,3}1 = 0 or α{1,3}1 = 1. In the first case, single
participation of the agent with the lowest peak is an equilibrium (since none of the other two
agents can unilaterally change the outcome); in the second case, single participation of the
agent with the highest peak is an equilibrium.
Responsiveness
Above, we have justified the responsiveness condition by an appeal to a ‘local non-imposition’
property: if all agents uniformly move in one direction, the outcome should not remain
unchanged. We have also shown that this condition is equivalent to the property that all
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phantom voters should be at the two extreme points 0 or 1. There may an even deeper
justification for the responsiveness condition in purely ordinal contexts. Indeed, if the set of
alternatives is linearly ordered but in a purely ordinal way, any specific location of a phantom
voter in the interior of the interval [0, 1] seems arbitrary. On the other hand, if cardinal
information is available, such as in the example of the dividing a fixed budget, phantoms may
placed in the midpoint (at 0.5), or distributed uniformly in [0, 1] (the latter specification is also
known as the ‘linear median,’ see Balinski and Laraki (2011) based on Jennings (2009)). In
any case, Theorem 1 fails without the responsiveness condition. As a simple example, consider
the case of an even number of agents N = {1, 2, ..., 2m}, and suppose that the phantom voters
are located as follows: m−1 phantom voters are at 0, m−1 phantom voters are at 1, and one
phantom voter is located in the interior, say at x ∈ (0, 1). Also, suppose that for any set of
2m−1 participants the standard median is chosen as the outcome. Consider any distribution
such that m agents have their peak below x and m agents have their peak above x. Then,
if all individuals’ costs are sufficiently small, full participation is an equilibrium. Indeed,
the outcome under full participation is x, and for any agent unilateral abstention moves the
outcome further away from her peak.
But even without the responsiveness condition, there often also exist profiles of peaks such
that only one single agent participates in equilibrium. Specifically, let p1 < p2 < ... < pN
be such that (i) {αkj }k=1,...,Nj=1,...,k+1 ∩ [p1, pN ] = ∅, i.e. all phantom voters are either below the
smallest peak or above the highest peak, and (ii) for all k = 1, ..., N , minj{αkj } < p1 and
pN < maxj{αkj }. (Note that condition (ii) is implied by efficiency of the voting mechanism.)
Then, we obtain single participation as the unique equilibrium by the same logic as in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Strategy-proofness
The assumption of strategy-proofness is essential for the conclusion of Theorem 1. Strategy-
proofness together with a suitable refinement concept such as robustness against small trem-
bles (‘perfectness’) implies that all participants will cast their vote truthfully. Evidently, the
proof of Theorem 1 hinges on that property. In particular, also the fact that the equilibrium
does not depend on individual costs (as long as they are all positive) crucially depends on the
strategy-proofness (together with the responsiveness condition).
To illustrate this, suppose we can use cardinal information and employ the following
symmetric version of the median rule. Let the peaks of the participants be ordered such that
p1 < p2 < ... < pk; for an odd number k = 2m − 1 the outcome is the standard median
pm, and for an even number k = 2m the outcome is the midpoint between the two middle
peaks (pm + pm+1)/2. This rule is not strategy-proof, and therefore we cannot assume that
the reported peaks coincide with the true peaks.6 Consider the peak distribution p1 = 0.1,
p2 = 0.45 and p3 = 0.9. Let p˜i be the reported peak by agent i, and assume that the
participation costs of the two extreme agents 1 and 3 are small but positive. Then, the
equilibrium depends, among other things, on the magnitude of the participation cost (i.e. the
6It is well-known that there exist no strategy-proof, anonymous and symmetric (‘neutral’) social choice
functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences for an even number of individuals, see Moulin (1980,
1988).
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precise shape of the preferences) of the median agent. If the participation cost of agent 2
is sufficiently small, full participation and truth-telling is an equilibrium in the simultaneous
game; on the other hand, if agent 2 prefers the outcome 0.5 without own participation to the
outcome 0.45 while participating, p˜1 = 0 and p˜3 = 1 is a (non-truthful) equilibrium.
Moreover, it is because of truthful voting in equilibrium that the conclusion of Theorem 1
is robust with respect to the timing of decisions. Indeed, in the sequential model participants’
voting strategy may depend on the set of other participants which becomes common knowledge
after all agents have made their participation decision. To illustrate this point, consider again
the peak distribution p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.45 and p3 = 0.9, but now assume that agents move
sequentially. In this case, full participation is no longer an equilibrium; indeed, if agent 3
does not participate, agents 1’s and 2’s optimal votes are p˜1 = 0 and p˜2 = 0.9, respectively,
with the outcome 0.45. Since this is the same outcome as under full participation, agent 3
prefers to abstain whenever she has positive participation costs. However, participation of
agents 1 and 2 with outcome 0.45 can also not be an equilibrium since then agent 1 has an
incentive to abstain. In this example, if all agents have sufficiently small (but strictly positive)
participation cost, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential voting game is
given by participation of agents 2 and 3 with votes p˜2 = 0 and p˜3 = 1, resulting in the outcome
0.5. In general, one has the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that in the sequential move game, the symmetric median rule is
used and that all agents have positive participation cost. In all subgame perfect equilibria
such that in the second stage a strong Nash equilibrium is played one has either (i) one single
participant, or (ii) an even number of participants and the outcome 0.5.
(Proof in Appendix)
We note that the single equilibrium participant in this result need not be an extreme voter
(in the above example with the peak distribution p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.45, p3 = 0.9 it could be
agent 2 provided that the participation cost for agent 3 is sufficiently high); this is at odds
with the intuition put forward in Osborne et al. (2000) and thus shows that conclusions about
voters’ participation in equilibrium crucially depend on institutional details. Also observe
that, in contrast to the case considered in Theorem 1, under the symmetric median rule an
equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist (an example is provided in the Appendix).
If one is prepared to give up strategy-proofness, a large class of possible rules emerges if
cardinal information is available. A simple example is the mean rule which takes the average
of all votes as the outcome (Renault and Trannoy, 2005). More generally, one can consider
the class of trimmed means (Louis et al., 2019). While the equilibria of these rules can still be
determined for fixed sets of participants, the analysis of the participation game becomes quite
complex due to the fact that in equilibrium participants will generally not vote truthfully; for
an analysis of the mean rule in the simultaneous participation game, see Mu¨ller et al. (2019).
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 and further examples
The proof of Proposition 1 is split into three lemmata. Lemma 1 shows that in every strong
Nash equilibrium with a fixed even number of participants the outcome is the median of
the two middle peaks and 0.5. Lemma 2 shows that all equilibria with an even number of
participants must have the outcome 0.5 while Lemma 3 shows that there exist no equilibria
with an odd number of participants greater than 1.
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Lemma 1. Consider the symmetric median rule with a fixed even number of participants k
with ordered peaks p1, ..., pk. There always exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and in all strong
Nash equilibria the outcome is the median of {p k
2
, 0.5, p k
2
+1}.
Proof. Case 1: p k
2
< 0.5 < p k
2
+1 :
In this case, it is easily verified that there is a unique strong Nash equilibrium: the k/2 agents
with peak lower than 0.5 vote for 0, while the k/2 agents with peak larger than 0.5 vote for
1, resulting in the outcome 0.5.
Case 2: p k
2
< p k
2
+1 ≤ 50 :
In this case strong Nash equilibrium is not unique (unless p k
2
+1 = 50) but all strong equilibria
in fact result in the same outcome. In all strong equilibria the k/2 agents with the lowest
peaks vote for 0, agent k2 + 1 votes for 2 · p k
2
+1 (≤ 1), and all other agents submit a vote
between 2 · p k
2
+1 and 1, resulting in the outcome p k
2
+1.
Case 3: 50 ≤ p k
2
< p k
2
+1 :
Analogously to Case 2, in all strong equilibria the k/2 individuals with the highest peaks vote
for 1, individual k/2 votes for 2 ·p k
2
−1 (≥ 0), and all other individuals submit a vote between
0 and 2 · p k
2
− 1 resulting in the outcome p k
2
.
Lemma 2. All equilibria of the sequential participation game under the symmetric median
rule with an even number of participants have the outcome 0.5 provided that in the second
stage participants play a strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium of the required sort
with an even number of participants k and an outcome that is different from 0.5. We will
show that this is not possible. By Lemma 1, the outcome is the median of p k
2
, 0.5 and p k
2
+1.
As the outcome is assumed to be different from 0.5, we must have either p k
2
< p k
2
+1 < 0.5 or
0.5 < p k
2
< p k
2
+1.
Case 1: p k
2
< p k
2
+1 < 0.5 :
In this case, Lemma 1 implies that the outcome is p k
2
+1. If an agent i <
k
2 + 1 (i.e. with a
peak below p k
2
+1) abstains, then there are
k
2 − 1 participants with a peak below p k
2
+1 and
k
2 − 1 participants with a peak above p k
2
+1. Hence j =
k
2 + 1 is the median participant and
the outcome is p k
2
+1. Since the outcome is unchanged, agent i has an incentive to abstain
whenever her participation costs are positive.
Case 2: 0.5 < p k
2
< p k
2
+1 :
By a completely symmetric argument, one shows that in this case every agent i > k2 (i.e.
with a peak above pn
2
) has an incentive to abstain since this would again not change the
outcome.
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Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there are no equilibria with an odd
number of participants greater than 1.
Proof. By contradiction, let k > 1 be the number of participants and let k be odd. Then, in
every (strong) Nash equilibrium, the median participant i = k+12 determines the outcome by
truthfully revealing her peak p k+1
2
.
Case 1: p k+1
2
= 0.5 :
Then, there are k−12 participants with a peak below 0.5 and
k−1
2 participants with a peak
above 0.5. Hence if agent k+12 abstains, the outcome will be the median of p k−1
2
, 0.5 and p k+3
2
by Lemma 1, that is the outcome will be 0.5. Thus, since the outcome would not change,
agent k+12 has an incentive to abstain.
Case 2: p k+1
2
< 0.5 :
If an agent i > k+12 (i.e. an agent with peak above the outcome) abstains, the outcome
becomes the median of p k−1
2
, 0.5 and p k+1
2
by Lemma 1. But since p k−1
2
< p k+1
2
< 0.5, this
means that the outcome does not change; hence, agent i will rather abstain.
Case 3: p k+1
2
> 0.5 :
This case is symmetric to Case 2.
We conclude with two examples. The first demonstrates that there could be several
equilibria of the sort required in Proposition 1 in the sequential model, the second shows that
there could exist no equilibria in pure strategies.
Example 1. Let p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.5 and p3 = 0.7. Then there exists an equilibrium of the
sort required in Proposition 1 with one participant and an equilibrium with an even number
of participants and outcome 0.5.
If agent 2 is the only participant, the outcome is 0.5. Neither agent 1 nor 3 has an incentive
to participate since the outcome would not change. If, on the other hand, agents 1 and 3
participate the outcome is again 0.5, hence agent 2 has no incentive to participate. If cost are
sufficiently small, agents 1 and 3 indeed prefer to participate, since otherwise the outcome
changes to 0.1 or 0.7 respectively.
Example 2. Let p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.8 and p3 = 0.9. Then there is no equilibrium of the sort
required in Proposition 1 (provided that costs of participation are small).
With full participation the outcome would be the median of the votes cast, that is: 0.8.
In that case agent 1 has an incentive to abstain, since without her the outcome remains
unchanged: indeed, agent 2 would vote p˜2 = 0.6 and agent 3 would vote of p˜3 = 1 in the
equilibrium of the subgame. But this situation cannot constitute an equilibrium either, since
agent 3 would rather abstain. If agents 1 and 2, or agents 1 and 3 are the participants, the
outcome is 0.5. But for small participation costs, the respective abstainer would prefers to
join and change the result to 0.8. Finally, all single participation cases do not constitute an
equilibrium since there always exists someone who abstains and could profitably change the
outcome to 0.5 (provided that participation costs are small).
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